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ABSTRACT 
For the U.S. Army, the fundamentally new concept of full spectrum operations requires 
that stability operations be internalized into its culture and operations.  The main research 
question of this thesis is: How can the Army internalize full spectrum operations, 
including stability operations, into its culture and operations?  Internalization specifies a 
cultural integration of stability operations represented by organizational attitudinal 
responses in the execution of full spectrum operations.   
The findings of this thesis are that full spectrum operations will be internalized in 
the U.S. Army under the following three conditions: 1) The National Security Strategy 
formally and consistently embraces the use of the military forces to conduct stability 
operations in support of national objectives.  As addressed in Chapter II, this is the best 
method for prompting the Army to accept full spectrum operations, and specifically 
stability operations, as a permanent mission-set with the accompanying imperative to 
internalize it. 2) The Army doctrinally evolves the full spectrum concept, and devises a 
training model that supports operationalizing full spectrum operations.  As described in 
Chapter III, addressing these imperatives requires the Army to rectify core issues such as 
leader development and the optimal force structure for full spectrum operations. 3) The 
Army is able to close the conceptual gaps in the whole-of-government approach to 
stability operations and overcome internal biases as represented by the current 
assignment and career development practices in the personnel system. 
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The Obama administration has embraced the national security strategy of “Smart 
Power” as a balance of hard power, emphasizing military centric approaches, and soft 
power, relying on a diplomatic multilateral tact.1  Accordingly, the Department of 
Defense has developed the principle of full spectrum operations, which envisions a 
spectrum of engagement from offensive and defensive combat operations to stability 
operations.  Stability operations require the military, in coordination with other elements 
of national power, to provide security within, and build the institutional capacity of, 
troubled states.  The key tenant of full spectrum operations is the concept that combat and 
stability operations are of co-equal importance.  Full spectrum doctrine envisions 
operations where the U.S. military transitions between all points along the spectrum 
(offense/defense and stability operations) as needed, to fulfill the mission.   
For the U.S. Army, this fundamentally new concept of full spectrum operations 
requires that stability operations be internalized into its culture and operations.  The main 
research question of this thesis is: How can the Army internalize full spectrum 
operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into its culture and operations?  
Internalization specifies a cultural integration of stability operations represented by 
organizational attitudinal responses in the execution of full spectrum operations.  This 
thesis will assert that the Army faces the following three challenges to internalizing full 
spectrum operations: 
1. Correlating the National Security Strategy to full spectrum operations 
doctrine, and by extension stability doctrine.  This is an external political 
condition that enables internalization by emphasizing the validity of 
stability operations as an enduring mission-set. 
2. Operationalizing full spectrum operations, specifically by the inclusion of 
stability operations.2  This challenge encompasses the internal friction 
inherent in incorporating new doctrinal practices of stability operations 
into the Army’s operational paradigm.  
                                                 
1 White House, The National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2010), 5. 
2 Operationalizing doctrine consists of translating the concept into plans for execution. 
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3. Overcoming the internal challenges to the internalization of full spectrum 
doctrine posed by conceptual and institutional barriers.  This challenge 
incorporates the friction points innate to adding stability operations to the 
Army’s reason for existence. 
The main focus of this thesis is the identification and analysis of decision points 
that will facilitate the Army’s internalization of full spectrum operations, and by 
extension stability operations, doctrine in support of national objectives.  This research 
correlates to the defense decision making and planning curriculum as it links the Army’s 
internal organizational decisions to national strategic initiatives.   
A. PROBLEM  
Central to the policy of Smart Power strategy is an imperative for prevention, 
likely in the form of a stability operation in a troubled state, to prevent collapse and the 
resultant deterioration of the international system.  U.S. Presidents have long relied on the 
expeditionary capabilities of the U.S. military to conduct stability operations, yet because 
they were not a formal mission, they remained on the Army’s intellectual and operational 
peripheries.  In 2005, DoD Directive 3000.5 Military Support to Stability Security 
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations corrected the operational paradigm by 
stating: 
Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department 
of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given 
priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and 
integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, 
training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, 
and planning.3  
This mandate, effectively creating the concept of full spectrum operations, 
necessitated the internalization of full spectrum operations into the culture and operations 
of the Army.   
                                                 
3 Gordon England, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, 
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2005), 2.  
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Organizational attitudinal responses include the cultural acceptance of stability 
operations precepts, within the hierarchy of full spectrum operations.  This can be 
demonstrated by the institutional training methods that develop full spectrum capable 
leaders, bolstered by the training institutions that generate full spectrum capable units.  A 
further indication of attitudinal responses is how the Army maintains that cultural 
acceptance absent active involvement in the two ongoing stability operations being 
carried out in Iraq and Afghanistan, and how the doctrine evolves to meet future 
contingencies.  The ultimate output of internalization is a reduced “lag time” in 
transitioning between combat and stability operations.  Secretary of Defense Robert 
Gates addressed this lag in terms of the time necessary to switch from high intensity 
combat to stability operations, while incorporating a nuanced understanding the 
fundamental differences between the two missions.4  
B. SUPPORTING RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis will address the major research question of how can the Army 
internalize full spectrum operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into its 
culture and operations, by concentrating on the following three supporting questions:  
Question One:  How important is a consistent correlation between the National 
Security Strategy and full spectrum operations doctrine to the Army’s internalization of 
stability operations as a permanent mission-set?  Key to this argument is the consistency 
with which the national security strategy specifies and integrates the tenets of stability 
operations.  This consistency can be measured over multiple strategies by successive 
administrations, and by examining supporting policies within the current strategy.  A 
survey of post-Cold War strategies reveals that while most strategies made extensive use 
of stability operations, many were ambiguous as to the role of them in the greater 
hierarchy of initiatives.  Further, the current strategy of Smart Power, although espousing  
 
 
                                                 
4 Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign 
Affairs (January/February 2009): 2. 
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the tenets of full spectrum operations, lacks conceptual congruency within supporting 
policies that inhibit indications to the Army that stability operations are a permanent 
mission set.    
Question Two:  How can the Army operationalize full spectrum operations, 
specifically the inclusion of stability operations, to allow the doctrine to be internalized?  
Operationalizing full spectrum operations doctrine requires decision points involving 
fundamental organizational tenets.  The first decision point is the creation and 
promulgation of full spectrum policy framework, as the basis for the doctrine itself, an 
effort that will be explored in depth by the literature review.  The second decision point 
requires optimizing force structure and training models to integrate offense/defense and 
stability operations into a comprehensive operational paradigm.  By evaluating the 
Army’s decision points for a full spectrum policy framework, along with an optimized 
force structure and training model this thesis can answer the question of how the Army 
can operationalize full spectrum operations.  
Question Three:  How will the Army overcome conceptual and institutional 
barriers to organizationally internalize full spectrum operations doctrine?  The 
preconditions of a consistent national strategy and an operationalized doctrine, as 
analyzed in the previous questions, form the basis for exploring the conceptual and 
institutional barriers to internalizing new doctrine.  Integral to this question is an 
understanding of the Army’s goals and institutional biases, as well as the conceptual 
shortcomings of the whole of government approach that must be negotiated for the Army 
to internalize full spectrum operations. 
C. TERMS OF ART 
1. Full Spectrum Operations 
Full spectrum operations apply to the joint force as well as the Army.  The 
foundations for Army operations conducted outside the United States and its territories 
are reflected in the elements of full spectrum operations: continuous, simultaneous 
combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks.  These combinations are 
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manifested in operations designed to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative using the 
mutually supporting lethal and nonlethal capabilities of the Army.  In full spectrum 
operations, the emphasis on the individual elements changes with echelon, time, and 
location.  No single element is more important than another; simultaneous combinations 
of the elements, constantly adapted to the dynamic conditions of the operational 
environment, are key to successful operations.5 
2. Stability Operations 
Stability operations leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the 
military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among 
local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; 
and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.  Through 
stability operations, military forces help to set the conditions that enable the actions of the 
other instruments of national power to succeed in achieving the broad goals of conflict 
resolution and stabilization.  Stability operations are usually conducted to support a host-
nation government; however, they may also support the efforts of a transitional civil or 
military authority when no legitimate government exists.6  Stability operations have been 
referred to as irregular warfare, small wars, peacekeeping, and military operations other 
then war. 
3. Internalize 
The demonstration of motor, verbal, and attitudinal responses, by members of an 
organization, which embody the fundamentals of a concept or idea (i.e., full spectrum 
operations doctrine).  Within the Army, motor, verbal, and attitudinal responses to a 
doctrine are the collective result of conditioning, familiarity, and acceptance.  Motor 
responses include testable skills that ascribe to a standard, such as rifle marksmanship or 
language proficiency.  Verbal responses encompass a demonstrated understanding of  
                                                 
5 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Full Spectrum Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters 
Department of the Army, 2008), paragraph 3–2. 
6 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of 
the Army, 2008), paragraph 2–2. 
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procedures or culture understanding. Attitudinal responses sit atop the hierarchy and 
include a demonstrated understanding of how a given concept fits within the larger scope 
of policy and strategy.7  
4. Operationalize 
The action of integrating a concept into the operational paradigm so that it may be 
organizationally executed.  For the Army, operationalizing new doctrine requires 
identifying key tasks and devising methods by which those tasks may be trained and 
evaluated in concert with existing operational requirements.  Operationalizing a concept, 
such as full spectrum operations, is an evolutionary process that requires constant re-
evaluation of best practices and synchronization with the existing operational paradigm.   
5. Doctrine 
A set of guiding principles that influence how concepts are to be operationalized.  
Army doctrine is designed to be permissive rather than restrictive in nature.8    
6. Capability 
An amalgamation of unit force structure, modernization, unit readiness, and 
sustainability. Together these four components define a unit’s ability to achieve a 
specified objective.9      
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This review will address significant theories organized around the two research 
problems that serve as the foundation for exploring the internalization of full spectrum 
operations doctrine: 1) The correlation of the National Security Strategy to full spectrum 
and specifically stability operations doctrine, and 2) Operationalizing full spectrum 
                                                 
7 James V. Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations, No Job for a Soldier, (New 
York: Rutledge Press, 2006), 140.  
8 Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations, 15. 
9 U.S. Joint Forces Command, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms (Norfolk, VA: U.S. Joint Forces Command, 2007), 338.  
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operations.  These two areas also constitute the wider foundation for exploring the third 
question concerning the conceptual and institutional barriers internal resistance points.    
1. National Security Strategy and Army Doctrine  
Linking the National Security Strategy and the Army doctrine of full spectrum 
operations is one of the intellectual underpinnings of this thesis.  Brian Linn’s The Echo 
of Battle: The Army’s Way of War, draws a correlation between the Army’s traditional 
intellectual interpretations of national security strategy and the concept of stability 
operations.  Linn makes the historical case for three non-mutually exclusive intellectual 
traditions within the Army: The Guardians, the Heroes, and the Managers.10  The 
Guardians see the Army’s function as protecting the homeland through a precise 
application of warfare, an application best entrusted to the professional officer corps.  
The Heroes tradition emphasizes the human aspect of warfare, deeming marshal esprit 
and adaptability as the most important factors in the art of warfare.  The Managers 
tradition attempts to frame warfare through the summation of processes and the 
application of technology to a problem.11  
Linn uses two historical eras to provide evidence of how Army doctrine and 
culture are influenced by national security strategy: The pre World War One era, and the 
post-Vietnam era.  Linn recounts the Army’s historical experiences with irregular warfare 
(stability operations) across the frontier and among the inherited territories of the former 
Spanish empire.  Linn concludes that while repetition allowed for isolated proficiency, 
the entire enterprise suffered from a lack of institutional emphasis.  Because it was never 
a specified mission irregular warfare remained subjugated to traditional war fighting, 
never gaining traction in the Army’s intellectual mainstream.  Examples of this limited 
proficiency include the evolved understanding of dealing with civilians.  When the Army 
occupied Mexico City in 1846-1849, it necessitated a new approach to civilian interaction 
characterized by distinctions between sanctioned combatants, innocent civilians, and 
                                                 
10 Brian McAllister Linn, The Echo of Battle: The Army’s Way of War (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2001) 4–8. 
11 Ibid., 4–8. 
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guerillas.  These distinctions were operationalized in the field and evolved to form the 
basis for the scant formal doctrine to emerge from irregular campaigns, Henry Halleck’s 
International Law, published in 1861.  This document was meant to serve as a guideline 
for civil-military operations in the aftermath of the Civil War, and thus codified the 
principles necessary to gain the cooperation of the populace and stifle opposition to 
military occupation.  Having been codified and practiced during such a concentrated 
large operation of Reconstruction, the basic tenets of International Law were internalized 
and used in subsequent irregular operations.  Even with the basic and temporary 
internalization of International Law, the intellectual traditions within the Army still 
essentially viewed irregular warfare as second-rate fighting and generally detracting to 
the “real” Army mission of winning wars against other armies.12  
Linn’s second example occurs during the post-Vietnam period, when the Army 
was intellectually adrift, having been sapped of its will for engaging in 
counterinsurgencies in the Third World.  Nixon’s Guam Doctrine (essentially freeing the 
U.S. from commitment in Vietnam, and directing attention to the Soviet Union) was more 
than enough of a suggestion for the Army to direct all resources towards preparing for 
high-intensity combat against the Warsaw Pact on the plains of Europe.  According to 
Linn, the intellectual traditionalists would draw the wrong conclusions from the Vietnam 
War and forsake an honest critique of U.S. counterinsurgency strategy for a narrative 
blaming careerist general officers and politicians.  Linn makes the case for an Army that, 
when left to its own intellectual devices, draws the wrong conclusions about its role in the 
national security strategy and will likely default to a comfort zone encapsulated by a 
focus on conducting conventional combat operations.13    
Ivo Daalder likewise argues that the Army, abetted by inconsistent national 
security strategies, has been opposed to the integration of stability operations in favor of 
focusing on traditional combat roles.14  He cites inconsistencies between the post-Cold 
                                                 
12 Linn, The Echo of Battle, 75. 
13 Ibid., 195. 
14 Ivo H. Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No, the Development of U.S. Policy for Peacekeeping,” in 
UN Peacekeeping Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, edited by William J. Durch (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1996), 44. 
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War National Security Strategy of multilateral peacekeeping initially embraced by the 
Clinton administration, and the Presidential Decision Directive 25 that reversed direction.  
PDD 25 entitled U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, set course by 
which the U.S. military would marshal its power to combat an enemy that would rise to 
near-peer status, instead of diffusing military resources among peacekeeping initiatives.15  
The directive also constrained the U.S. financial contribution to the United Nations 
peacekeeping regime to 25 percent of the peacekeeping budget.16 While this initiative 
effectively put stability and peacekeeping operations on the back burner as far as military 
priorities, it did nothing to stem the increasing frequency of U.S. involvement in stability 
operations.  This dichotomy was played out in major U.S. interventions from Haiti to 
Bosnia, resulting in a situation where the U.S. foreign policy of intervening in failing 
states was fundamentally disconnected from the military’s priority of training for combat 
operations.   
Daalder characterizes these inconsistencies as an evolutionary process rooted in 
the U.S. strategic attempts to balance being the sole superpower with the need to 
intervene in crises around the globe.  He further contends that this lack of balance was 
reflected in the inability to synchronize national security strategy with military doctrine.  
The seminal example of this imbalance was General Colin Powell’s “doctrine” that the 
U.S. military was to be employed as the nation’s safeguard against threats; implicit in this 
statement is that stability operations do not warrant acceptance as a threat, and further 
that employing the military in stability operations degrades their ability to counter 
threats.17  The context of this doctrine was out of balance with the operational realities of 
the period which saw a dramatic uptick in the use of the U.S. military to execute stability 
operations.  
Francis Fukuyama’s State Building Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century, summarizes the challenges that the post-9/11 world to lay the groundwork for 
                                                 
15 White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25 U.S. Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace 
Operations (Washington, DC: The White House, 1994), 1. 
16 Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” 44. 
17 Ibid., 44.  
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the eventual mandate of stability operations as a military mission.   His premise that state 
building, either as it applies to creating new states or to strengthen existing ones, is the 
most significant issue facing the international system.  The international system, defined 
by interconnectedness and the Westphalian traditions of sovereignty, forces states to 
assume functions in the interest of their citizens and the international community as a 
whole.18  Fukuyama argues that global challenges, especially economic instability, and 
military aggression can be traced back to the need to strengthen states, emphasizing 
methods to improve bureaucratic organizations as the basis for enhancing stability in a 
state.  Fukuyama wraps up his argument by advocating intervention, essentially using the 
military for stability operations, in unstable states for the common good of the 
international system.19  Fukuyama’s concepts were accepted by the George W. Bush’s 
administration as they sought a new way forward in the post-9/11 world, and were 
subsequently used as the basis for the formulation of the stability operations doctrine.20 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s Department of Defense Directive 
3000.05 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) 
Operations directed the creation of full spectrum operations by elevating stability 
operations on par with offense/defense operations.  This document signaled the beginning 
of the synchronization between the national security strategy embracing multilateral 
stabilization operations and Department of Defense policy embodied by full spectrum 
operations.  DoD Directive 3000.5, in granting stability operations equal precedence with 
combat operations, exemplified the transitional nature of full spectrum operations.21  The 
DoD directive was echoed in the subsequent publication of the Army Field Manual 3-0 
Operations, which codified the Army’s doctrinal approach to integrating stability 
operations into the full spectrum of operations.22  The National Security Strategy of 2007 
                                                 
18 Francis Fukuyama, State Building Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2004), 57.  
19 Ibid., 124. 
20John Harlow, “Army Unveils New Stability Operations Manual,” October, 6, 2008, 
http://www.army.mil/-newsreleases/2008/10/06/13091-army-unveils-new-stability-operations-manual. 
21 England, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05, 2. 
22 U.S. Army. Field Manual 3-0 Full Spectrum Operations, paragraph 2–6. 
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incorporated the precepts of stability doctrine in direct response to the challenges faced 
by the ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and aptly segued for the Obama 
administration’s application of smart power.  This circumstance allowed the military 
doctrine of full spectrum operations to get a head start in synchronizing and internalizing 
the new National Security Strategy of smart power.  Smart power was articulated in the 
2010 National Security Strategy and the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review.23  Both 
documents recognize the limits of offense/defense operations and highlight stability 
operations as the lead initiative for engaging current challenges.24  
Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations represents the latest articulation of 
stability operations doctrine based directly on the preceding litany of policy and doctrine.  
FM 3-07 describes how full spectrum operations link offense, defense, and stability 
operations together into a cohesive mission set to be prepared for and executed on a 
simultaneous and continuous basis.  The manual outlines the key tasks involved in 
stability operations including: 
Support a partner nation during peacetime military engagement, after a 
natural or man-made disaster, as part of a humanitarian-based limited 
intervention, during peace operations to enforce international peace 
agreements, to support a legitimate host-nation government during 
irregular warfare, during major combat operations to establish conditions 
that facilitate post-conflict activities, and in a post-conflict environment 
following the general cessation of organized hostilities.  This manual 
emphasizes the need to establish a unity of effort between military, other 
government organizations, and non-governmental humanitarian 
organizations to successfully strengthen host nation governmental 
capacity.25  
Standing out amongst the tasks are those that involve building host-nation 
institutional capacity, especially in the judicial system and the police.  Essential tasks, 
such as enacting interim legal codes and procedures permitted by international law, will 
entail new approaches to preparing Army forces to execute stability operations.26          
                                                 
23 Robert Gates, DOD Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington, DC: The Pentagon, 2010), 17. 
24 White House, The National Security Strategy, 47. 
25 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, paragraph 2–2.  
26 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, paragraph 6–18.  
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2. Operationalizing Stability and Offense/Defense Operations 
The challenges of operationalizing stability operations are addressed via several 
methods from training approaches to unit configurations.  The Army has chosen to 
address this issue within the context of leader focus.  In the Training and Doctrine 
Command Pamphlet 525-3-1, The Army Operating Concept 2016-2028, the Army 
distinguishes between the enemy-centric focus of offense/defense operations and the 
much broader environmental focus of stability operations.  Recognizing the Army as a 
leader-focused organization, the pamphlet charges the unit commander with focusing 
resources on the correct aspect of the spectrum.  This nuanced point of leader-driven 
focus to negotiate the operational differences between these approaches can be aptly 
summed up in a passage from The Army Operating Concept:  
Intelligence automatically defaults to focusing on the enemy if the 
commander is not involved in setting priorities and explaining why they 
are important.  To succeed in complex environments [stability operations] 
commanders must collaborate throughout their organizations to build the 
narrative.27 
Robert M. Perito argues that the task of operationalizing stability operations is too 
large for the Army to adequately bridge with leadership alone.  Perito instead argues that 
the skill set required for stability operations is so fundamentally distinct from those 
necessary in combat operations, that it is necessary to develop a separate stability force to 
assume those duties.  The crux of his argument resides is that stability operations, 
because of their innate focus on civilian interaction yet expeditionary nature, are best 
executed by paramilitary constabulary forces.28  Perito describes the rich U.S. history of 
fielding constabulary forces externally, as opposed to other developed countries that 
typically field a constabulary force to augment domestic law enforcement.  This history 
has been modified in the post-Cold War era to include the use of contractors to support 
U.S. commitments to international missions requiring a constabulary capability.  These 
                                                 
27 U.S. Army, Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-3-1 The Army Operating Concept 
2016-2028 (Washington D.C. Headquarters Department of the Army, 2010), paragraph 3–4. 
28 Robert M. Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a 
Postconflict Stability Force (Washington, DC: Endowment for the U.S. Institute for Peace, 2004), 33–35. 
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missions, under U.N. authority, have been met with the complications of spotty 
international support, logistical inadequacies, and mandates that are insufficiently 
resourced for the efficient employment of constabulary capabilities.  Thus, international 
mission requirements often default to the U.S. military’s blunt force capabilities, when 
the situation becomes too volatile or politically important to fail.  His proposal of creating 
a stability force augments the full spectrum principle of a reduction in lag time.  First, it 
allows for a unified command effort, a necessity in the ambiguous post-conflict 
environment of a stability operation.  Second, it provides the basis for “plugging-in” 
other like assets from other U.S. agencies and partner nations.29     
The Army has decided forego the creation of a specialized stability force and 
instead use general purpose forces trained to specific mission parameters to conduct 
missions across the spectrum of operations.  The 2008 version of Army Field Manual 7-0, 
Training the Force lays out a framework for training a general purpose force to execute 
the full spectrum of operations: 
Units do not have the time or other resources required to train under the 
conditions of all operational environments along the spectrum of conflict. 
Therefore, Headquarters, Department of the Army, analyzes possible 
operational environments and determines the likely force package 
requirements for each operational theme at the points along the spectrum 
of conflict where Army forces are most likely to operate. Based on this 
analysis and Headquarters, Department of the Army, guidance, Army 
command, Army Service component command, and direct reporting unit 
commanders focus their subordinate units’ training on specific operational 
themes.30 
Nathan Freier asserts that the configuration of stability forces should further 
correlate to the anticipated operating environment, in his concept known as “armed 
stabilization.”  Freier makes the case that forces operating in the stability portion of the 
spectrum should be: 
[O]ptimized for circumstances where: (1) vital interests are challenged by 
violent unconventional threats; (2) the degree of violence itself is quite 
                                                 
29 Perito, Where is the Lone Ranger, 325. 
30 U.S. Army, Field Manual 7-0 Training The Force (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of 
the Army, 2008), paragraph 3–24. 
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high and the environment is non-permissive; (3) physical threats 
demonstrate some organization and relative sophistication at various 
levels; and finally, (4) foreign partners suffer from substantial loss or 
complete failure of sovereign control over political and security 
outcomes.31  
Freier concludes that due to the complex nature of full spectrum operations, the 
Army’s concept of using general purpose forces to operate in an environment as 
described above is sub-optimal.  In a later study, MIA in QDR: A Unifying Vision for 
Land Forces, he argues that the Army’s concept of organizing and training for stability 
operations is fundamentally impossible.  He instead postulates that bridging the gap 
between combat and stability operations will come as a joint function of specialization 
among the services.  In this case, the integration of stability operations will be more 
aligned with the land component forces, the Army and Marines, while offense/defense 
operations will be more aligned to the Navy and Air Force.32  Freier understands the 
inherent risks of focusing the land components on stability at the decrement of combat 
capabilities, however, he hypothesizes that this general trend will self-perpetuate as 
operational deployments drive the specialization. 
In summary, there are significantly varying schools of thought regarding how the 
Army should operationalize stability operations.  The most common differences lie 
between the Army’s general purpose do-everything force, and the argument in favor of 
specialized forces.   
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be divided into four chapters.  Chapter I will introduce the 
framework of the general research question, define relevant terminology, review pertinent 
scholarly work addressing the research question, and set the course for the rest of the 
thesis.  
                                                 
31 Nathan Freier, “The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. 
Landpower,” Small Wars Journal (April 2009): viii. 
32 Nathan Freier, “MIA in QDR: A Unifying Vision for Land Forces,” Small Wars Journal (March 
2010): 4.  
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Chapter II will argue that a consistent correlation between National Security 
Strategy tenets and stability operations doctrine, both over successive administrations and 
through conceptual uniformity, will prompt the Army to recognize stability operations as 
a permanent mission-set and create the imperative to internalize full spectrum operations 
doctrine.  First, this chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of post-Cold War 
national security strategies and the resultant ideals internalized by the Army, to make the 
case for inconsistent national strategies as the catalyst for the Army not previously 
accepting stability operations as a permanent mission-set.  Furthermore, this chapter will 
compare components of the current National Security Strategy of Smart Power and it’s 
supporting conceptual foundations, to tenets of stability operations doctrine, this will 
provide evidence of the adequacy of smart power as a strategy that prompts the Army to 
recognize the stability mission-set as permanent, and creates the imperative to internalize 
full spectrum operations doctrine. 
Chapter III will address how the Army operationalizes (integrates a concept into 
the operational paradigm so that it may be organizationally executed) full spectrum 
operations to enable stability operations doctrine to be internalized.  Full spectrum 
operations compel Army commanders to simultaneously engage in offensive, defensive, 
and stability operations specifically to maintain or gain the initiative in support of 
strategic goals.33  Full spectrum operations doctrine specifically requires the Army to 
operationalize the new tasks associated with stability operations, while maintaining 
operational proficiency in combat operations.  The main point of this chapter is to 
investigate how can the Army operationalize full spectrum operations, specifically the 
inclusion of stability operations, to allow the doctrine to be internalized.    
Chapter IV will expand on findings of the previous chapters to identify and 
analyze the Army’s internal challenges to internalizing full spectrum doctrine, posed by 
conceptual and institutional barriers, and frame them as decision points that must be 
overcome.  Framing this analysis are the following two challenges:  1) How can the 
Army execute stability operations when the other concerned government agencies lack 
                                                 
33 U.S. Army, Field Manual 3-0 Operations, Foreword.  
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the necessary capability to execute a whole of government approach?   2) Which internal 
biases must be overcome to implement a full spectrum capable force, as a requirement for 
internalizing stability operations?  Integral to both of these challenges is an understanding 
of Army’s desired end-state for institutionalizing stability operations capabilities, and the 
conceptual shortcomings of the whole of government approach, both of which will be 
explored in this chapter.  This chapter will identify the two challenges with the Army’s 
internal decision points, and offer analysis of those decisions that will enable the 
internalization of full spectrum operations in the Army. 
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II. THE CORRELATION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
STRATEGY AND THE INTERNALIZATION OF STABILITY 
OPERATIONS DOCTRINE 
This chapter will argue that a consistent correlation between National Security 
Strategy tenets and stability operations doctrine, both over successive administrations and 
through conceptual uniformity, will prompt the Army to recognize stability operations as 
a permanent mission-set and create the imperative to internalize full spectrum operations 
doctrine.  First, this chapter will conduct a comparative analysis of post-Cold War 
national security strategies and the resultant ideals internalized by the Army, to make the 
case for inconsistent national strategies as the catalyst for the Army not previously 
internalizing stability operations as a core mission.  Further, this chapter will compare 
components of the current National Security Strategy of Smart Power, and it’s supporting 
conceptual foundations, to tenets of stability operations doctrine to draw conclusions as 
to the adequacy of smart power as a strategy that prompts the Army to recognize the 
stability mission-set as permanent, and create the imperative to internalize stability 
operations doctrine. 
A. POST-COLD WAR NATIONAL STRATEGIES AND THE RESULTING 
ARMY INTERNALIZATION  
This section will focus on analyzing the post-Cold War period because it 
adequately lends itself to an evaluation of the wider concepts in this thesis.  Post-Cold 
War national security strategies can be categorized into two historical eras:  1) The 
1990s, defined by the U.S. attempts to define its role as the world’s sole superpower. 2) 
Post-9/11, defined by the U.S. led interventions into unstable regions to disrupt terror 
networks.   
1. Inconsistent National Security Strategies—the 1990s 
President George H.W. Bush, when faced with the demise of the Soviet Union, 
chose to chart his National Security Strategy through the United Nations by enhancing 
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support of the international peacekeeping regime.34  His plan included an increase in 
funding and troop contributions to the U.N. to counter the uncertainties created in the 
wake of the new world order.  Even though his administration achieved a high level of 
credibility with victory in the Gulf War, his vision ran into opposition when he proposed 
a U.S. standby force be made available to the U.N. for crisis contingencies.35  When 
President Bush was voted out of office in 1992, this inchoate policy initiative was passed 
on to the Clinton Administration for articulation.   
President Clinton’s first national security strategy was preceded by a Department 
of Defense Bottom Up Review, published by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in 1993.  
This document was an internal review, meant to garner consensus on a subsequent 
national security strategy.  The review analyzed the turbulent state of the post-Cold War 
international system and specifically identified military intervention as a tool for 
multilateral engagement: 36 
Through overseas presence and power projection, our armed forces can 
help deter or contain violence in volatile regions where our interests are 
threatened. In some circumstances, U.S. forces can serve a peacekeeping 
role, monitoring and facilitating the implementation of cease-fire and 
peace agreements with the consent of the belligerent parties as part of a 
U.N. or other coalition presence. In more hostile situations, the United 
States might be called upon, along with other nations, to provide forces to 
compel compliance with international resolutions or to restore order in 
peace enforcement operations.37  
Coincidently, the review was released nearly simultaneously with the infamous 
Battle of Mogadishu, where 18 U.S. Rangers were killed.  The mission to Somalia had 
started off as a humanitarian assistance effort under U.N. authority, and drifted into 
conflict with warlords, with disastrous results.38  The implications of the Mogadishu 
battle on Clinton’s National Security Strategy were far-ranging.  Foremost, he was forced 
                                                 
34 Daalder, “Knowing When to Say No,” 37. 
35  Ibid., 37. 
36 Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom-Up Review (Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, 1993), Section 1. 
37 Ibid., Section 2. 
38 George J. Church, “Somalia: Anatomy of a Disaster,” Time Magazine (October 1993): 9. 
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to reorient his strategic goals onto more traditional national interests such as support to 
key allies and energy security.  This was a deliberate shift away from initiatives such as 
the U.N. peacekeeping regime where casualties, such as those experienced in Somalia, 
were difficult to justify.39  The reorientation away from stability operations was formally 
codified the following year with the release of Presidential Decision Dericitve-25 (PDD-
25).  This document affirmed the U.S. commitment to this new course by retooling the 
method for contributing financially to the peacekeeping regime, and iterated the primacy 
of vital national interest in justifying the commitment of U.S. troops.  The directive 
prioritized the use of the military for fighting the nation’s wars over commitments to 
peacekeeping. 40  PDD-25 could not stem the events that now followed the end of the 
cold war, with an escalation of global strife and instability prompting the military to 
execute an unprecedented number of interventions as the U.S. asserted a world leadership 
role.  The official strategies adopted in the 1990s charted a course away from 
multilateralism and cast peacekeeping as a temporary mission set, a view at odds with the 
realities of constant military interventions.     
2. What the Army Internalized From Inconsistent Strategy in the 1990s 
As a result of this dichotomy between strategy and reality, the Army internalized 
the following three ideals: 1) Army readiness for high intensity combat equals readiness 
for peacekeeping. 2) Force protection, or safety of U.S. soldiers, is the primary 
consideration for peacekeeping. 3) Rules of engagement ensure the moral high ground.  
The combined internalization of these ideals served to marginalize the importance of 
peacekeeping operations.  
Equating readiness for combat and peacekeeping was born out of the doctrine of 
Air-Land Battle.  The Army created Air-Land Battle to defeat the Soviets on the plains of 
Europe and received the opportunity to validate its doctrine in the deserts of Kuwait and 
Iraq in the winter of 1991.  The Army’s quick and decisive defeat of the Iraqis in the Gulf 
War helped internalize Air-Land Battle as a doctrinal concept.  It produced an 
                                                 
39 Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations, 46. 
40 White House, Presidential Decision Directive 25, 1. 
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exaggerated sense of how post-Cold War military expeditions would and should be 
approached:  Through the use of overwhelming and coordinated force to destroy enemy 
formations and infrastructure.  This emphasis on high intensity combat combined with 
the official notion that peacekeeping was a distracting trend, led the Army to internalize 
the ideal:  If the Army is ready to fight the big wars (high intensity combat) then less 
important missions, such as peacekeeping, can easily be accomplished.41  This sentiment 
was best summed up by General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff when he stated: “to this day the doctrine remains that the best peacekeepers are 
the soldiers best trained for combat.”42 
The military’s culture of force protection was born of the failed Somalia 
operation.  The leadership in charge of the Somalia operation, notably Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin and Major General William F. Garrison, were summarily dismissed 
for their failings.  This dismissal was a signal from the civilian management to Army 
leadership that they must internalize the concept of risk aversion at the peril of their 
commands and careers.  Field commanders thus ascribed to the following logic:  
Casualties are politically unacceptable, and I must take steps to alleviate casualties in the 
execution of my mission, or else I may be fired.  By the time of the U.S. intervention into 
Bosnia, this ideal was fully internalized within the U.S. Army. 
A force protection staff section was created, with tentacles at all levels of 
staff and command, troops wore complete body armor at all times, were 
cantoned, and were closely regulated in their movements beyond the wire.  
Contact was limited by orders that required GIs to remain armed, helmeted 
and clothed in their camouflaged combat gear.  A guide had become the 
law, doctrine had become dogma.43      
                                                 
41 Christina Madison Fishback, “Doctrine in the Post-Vietnam Era: A Crisis of Confidence,” in An 
Army at War, Change in the Midst of Conflict, 621–626, ed. John J. McGrath (FT Leavenworth, KS: 
Combat Studies Institute Press, 2005). 
42 Joe Kline, “It’s Time for Extreme Peacekeeping,” Time Magazine, November 16, 2003, 47. 
http://www.time.com/time/columnist/klein/article/0,9565,543748,00.html. 
43 Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations, 46. 
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In a risk-adverse political environment, force protection became the operative 
concept that would decrease the chance of a soldier being unnecessarily killed or 
wounded.    
Emphasis on the rules of engagement was internalized in response to the marked 
uptick in the use of the U.S. military to conduct operations amongst civilians.  The 
concept was based in the precept that perception matters, in convincing local populations 
to comply with military efforts and in the court of international opinion.  An example of 
this can be found in Haiti, where U.S. soldiers deployed under a U.N. mandate to restore 
order, but stood idle as the Haitian National Police mercilessly beat a crowd of civilians 
in view of the worldwide media.  The message conveyed by the media images was that 
the U.S. soldiers condoned the actions of the police.44  Rigid rules of engagement and 
inexperience in dealing with civilians resulted in the costly indecision.  This episode gave 
the perception that the U.S. military could not sufficiently handle the moral complexities 
of dealing with civilians and prompted a knee jerk reaction that set rules for every 
conceivable situation.  The rules of engagement became an internalized concept as 
evidenced by a Marine pilot utilizing four separate rules of engagement cards en route to 
a mission over Kosovo.45  The internalization of the rules of engagement did not promote 
adaptive leaders guided by principle, a trait especially useful in peacekeeping operations, 
but instead fostered a culture that refers each situation to a rule book for adjudication.    
The pressures inherent in internalizing a preference for high intensity combat, 
force protection, and the rules of engagement, led the Army to view peacekeeping 
operations as an enterprise that distracted from the real work of soldiering. 
3. National Security Strategy Post-9/11   
This era was marked by the national security strategy of preemption in response 
to the attacks of 9/11 and underpinned by two concepts.  First, the ideal espoused by 
President George W. Bush, that the American military had been overused for 
                                                 
44 Margaret Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, “Interagency and Political Military Dimensions of Peace 
Operations: Haiti-A Case Study,” (Washington D.C: National Defense University, 1996): 47–48. 
45 Arbuckle, Military Forces in 21st Century Peace Operations, 167.  
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peacekeeping in the 1990s and that a return to the core competency of war fighting was in 
order.46  Second, the theory embodied by the “revolution in military affairs” that touted 
technology as a force multiplier and a logical extension of Air-Land Battle doctrine.  The 
amalgamation of these ideals and the strategy of preemption led the Army to near defeat 
in the sands of Iraq that triggered a shift to an official recognition, in the form of DoD 
Directive 3000.05, of stability operations precepts.   
This era was defined by two policies: 1) The National Security Strategy of 
preemption. 2) The drafting of DoD Directive 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations.  The latter is the source document 
representing the correction of the flawed ideals internalized by the Army over the 
previous decade. 
a. The Initial Set 
The era commenced with President Bush’s 2002 National Security 
Strategy that articulated the policy of preemption:  
The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to 
counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, 
the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for 
taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if the uncertainty 
remains as to the time and place of theenemy's attack. To forestall or 
prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.47 
This policy iterated the prerogative of the U.S. to use force absent 
international approval.  This policy represented a fundamental shift away from  
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international consensus building by adopting a “go-it-alone” attitude.48  By marginalizing 
the need for international legitimacy the policy of preemption marginalized the U.S. role 
in peacekeeping operations. 
Underpinning the preemption strategy was the core belief that the military 
should not be dulled by peacekeeping duty.  The terms peacekeeping and nation building 
were discarded from the civil-military lexicon, supplanted by the notion that military 
forces would be used solely for war.  This notion was complimented by the concepts 
inherent in the revolution in military affairs (RMA).  This theory existed as a logical 
extension of Air-Land Battle and fit neatly into the paradigm that readiness for high 
intensity combat equals readiness for lesser contingencies such as stability operations.  
The RMA concept evolved throughout the 1990s and was embraced by Secretary of 
Defense Rumsfeld in the early 2000s.  The RMA foresaw engagements that required 
fewer boots on the ground, less reliance on conventional forces, and a more emphasis on 
special operations forces buoyed by technological superiority.49   
b. Iraq: The Game Changer 
Charged with the post-invasion occupation of Iraq, the U.S. Army 
uncovered flaws in the ideals that had been internalized, namely that combat readiness 
equaled readiness for stability operations, and that technology could supplant boots on 
the ground.  These flaws contributed to the Army’s general unpreparedness in the face of 
a mounting insurgency that gripped post-invasion Iraq, and endangered the entire 
enterprise.  The Army determined that an unfettered supply of drones and bombs could 
not make up for soldiers on the ground, and worse that a propensity towards high 
intensity combat was counterproductive to a counterinsurgency campaign.  The factors 
that turned the tide in Iraq, a skillfully implemented counterinsurgency campaign and a 
whole of government approach, were essentially bottom up initiatives forged on the 
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battlefields, and adopted by a national security establishment desperate to salvage the 
Iraq war.50  DoD Directive 3000.05 drafted in 2005, was an attempt at correcting the 
flawed ideals that the Army had unsuccessfully operationalized in Iraq.      
4. The Army’s Lessons Learned From the 2000s 
Resultant from the tumultuous events of the 2000s, the Army learned two lessons: 
1) Reliance on the internalized precepts of combat operations, especially the propensity 
for kinetic operations almost caused the loss of the Iraq War.  2) Operations such as 
counterinsurgency and stability operations must be executed in concert with other 
elements of national power.  These two lessons were the foundation for the creation of 
full spectrum, and by extension stability operations, doctrine. 
Reliance on Air-Land Battle doctrine represented a comfort zone for the Army, 
around which the flawed notion that readiness for combat equated to readiness for 
occupation duty in the civilian intensive environment of post-invasion Iraq.  When 
stressed, the Army as an organization, reverted to its comfort zone and came to rely on 
heavy handed kinetic operations to counter the insurgency.  This institutionally reflexive 
action prolonged the war, and cost thousands of additional lives in the process.  As an 
institution, the Army internalized the fact that it cannot kill its way out of an insurgency, 
because every fighter will be replaced in turn; and that the population represents the 
decisive terrain that must be secured and co-opted by every effort.  These new lessons ran 
counter to the previously internalized notions that emphasized fighting and killing the 
enemy, and implementing force protection measures that alienated the population.  The 
Army learned that adaptation was the key to success, and created the doctrine of full 
spectrum operations with the integral concept that a competent unit must be able to 
execute operations at any point in the spectrum with minimal lag time between tasks.        
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Janine Davidson, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Plans wrote: “Today, 
the question from soldiers is not what is USAID, but where is USAID?”51  This quote 
reflects the realization that mastery over the complex operating environments faced in the 
post-9/11 world requires all the elements of national power in a concept known as the 
whole of government approach.  A major step toward the realization of the 
comprehensive approach was the drafting of the stability operations doctrine, Field 
Manual 3-07.  This doctrine is unprecedented in that it represents a collaborative process 
involving input from academia, non-governmental organizations and other agencies of 
the federal government.52  Field Manual 3-07 delineates stability operations as a pillar of 
full spectrum operations and describes the unique tenets that comprise the whole of 
government approach.     
B. THE CORRELATION OF SMART POWER AND STABILITY 
OPERATIONS 
This section will draw a correlation between Smart Power strategy and stability 
operations doctrine in support of the greater argument that an alignment of national 
strategy with stability operations tenets will encourage the internalization of full spectrum 
operations doctrine.  This section will describe the current strategy of Smart Power and 
stability operations doctrine separately, and further compare and contrast them to 
determine commonalities and disconnects. 
1. Smart Power Defined 
Smart Power is the current national security strategy that strives to balance 
elements of hard power, that emphasizes military centric approaches, and soft power that 
articulates a diplomatic tact.53  The goal of Smart Power is to maintain U.S. 
predominance in the international system by influencing solutions to common 
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problems.54  The basis of Smart Power is U.S. led multilateral engagement as articulated 
by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Michele Flournoy:   
Remaining engaged is absolutely essential. Neo-isolationism is not an 
option. Engagement means shoring up the fundamentals of the 
international system that I mentioned before: open commerce based on 
free and fair access to air, sea, space and cyberspace; strong alliance 
structures based on respect and willingness to share burdens; commitment 
to international norms that shore up and contribute to the advancement of 
our national interests; and securing those global goods that are the 
backbone of a renewed effort to restore and revitalize American global 
leadership.55  
Achieving these goals requires a balanced approach among the major purveyors 
of foreign and national security policy, the Departments of State and Defense.  
2. Smart Power Specified and Implied Tasks 
Smart Power strategy specifies five initiatives as a common framework for U.S. 
foreign and national security policy agencies: Alliances, partnerships, and institutions; 
Global development; Public diplomacy; Economic integration; and Technology and 
innovation.56  These initiatives are complimented by the two implied concepts of: 
Preventative engagement; and the whole of government approach. 
These five specified initiatives aim to strike a balanced approach to codify Smart 
Power strategy by elevating their priority for effort and resources.  An example is the 
Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a State Department program, which aims to 
strengthen alliances, partnerships, and institutions.  Through GPOI, the U.S. trains 
militaries of select nations to perform United Nations peacekeeping duties, emphasizing 
ethical treatment of civilians, working with non-governmental organizations, and the 
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importance of civil military relations. 57  Through the increase of 75,000 peacekeepers, 
GPOI is strengthening partnerships, and increasing the international community’s 
capacity to meet future challenges.   
Smart Power strategy recognizes that state and regional instability can have an 
unacceptably disruptive effect on the international system.  The implication is that the 
prevention of state instability is preferred to a later and more costly intervention.  The 
second implication of Smart Power is that stabilization efforts be comprehensively 
executed by all components of national power in a concept termed the whole of 
government approach.  Operationalizing this concept requires a unified effort where 
concerned government departments work in concert to accomplish the overall stability 
mission.  An example of the whole of government approach is the integrated political and 
military strategy for stabilizing the Afghanistan/ Pakistan region, and specifically the 
Defense and State Department coordinated plans for increasing capacity within Afghan 
National Security Forces.58  The implied concepts of preventative intervention and the 
whole of government approach are fundamental to linking Smart Power strategy and 
stability operations doctrine.   
3. Stability Operations  
Stability operations doctrine is the guideline for providing security within, and 
building institutional capacity of, troubled states.  It is subordinate to the capstone 
concept of Full Spectrum Operations.  Stability operations are predicated on two 
precepts: The Army will prepare and conduct them in equal precedence with offense and 
defense operations; they must be executed with the assistance and coordination of the 
whole of the U.S. government.  Army Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations formalizes 
Army roles in stability operations, and reinforces the baseline precepts:    
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As the Nation continues into this era of uncertainty and persistent conflict, 
the lines separating war and peace, enemy and friend, have blurred and no 
longer conform to the clear delineations we once knew.  At the same time, 
emerging drivers of conflict and instability are combining with rapid 
cultural, social, and technological change to further complicate our 
understanding of the global security environment.  Military success alone 
will not be sufficient to prevail in this environment. To confront the 
challenges before us, we must strengthen the capacity of the other 
elements of national power, leveraging the full potential of our 
interagency partners.59 
Stability operations doctrine thus attempts to balance being one of three co-equal 
Army operations, while incorporating the other elements of national power into the 
operational fold.      
4. Stability Operations Specified and Implied Tasks  
Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations specifies five sectors of civil/military 
focus, plus one area, information engagement, that unites these efforts: Security, justice 
and reconciliation, humanitarian and social well-being, governance and participation, 
economic stabilization and infrastructure.  Implied in the doctrine are the implicit notions 
that, the Army may be initially responsible for these tasks because it is the first 
responder, and relevant U.S. government civilian agencies will have the capability to lead 
or co-execute these tasks alongside Army units in the field.   
These specified tasks represent a broad framework for guiding the military in 
establishing stability in a troubled state; however each is bolstered by the implication that 
the Army will not be acting alone.  For example, the task of economic stabilization and 
infrastructure has sub-tasks that the Army can reasonably be expected to execute alone, 
such as: Secure and protect the natural resources, energy production, and distribution 
infrastructure of the host nation. 60  Other tasks such as, economic stabilization and 
infrastructure however, have sub-tasks that require a level of expertise not typically found 
in Army formations, for example: Implement programs that encourage trade and 
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investment with initial emphasis on host-nation and regional investors. Inherent to these 
specified tasks is the implicit notion that the Army cannot accomplish these tasks without 
a whole of government approach among several elements of the federal government.61   
5. Strategy Doctrine Correlations 
Figure 1 draws a conceptual connection between the basic tenets of Smart Power 
strategy, as defined by the CSIS Commission on Smart Power, and stability operations 
doctrine in Field Manual 3-07. These connections are shown between the respective sub-
tasks of Smart Power strategy and stability operations doctrine, as depicted in the dashed 
box, and anchored by the basic tenets of each across the top and sides.   
 
Figure 1.   Conceptual Intersection Points: National Security Strategy and Stability 
Doctrine 
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In comparing operational imperatives to strategic goals, the objective is to show 
conceptual congruencies resultant from a general alignment of specified tasks.  For 
example, the association between the Smart Power precept of Global Development and 
the Stability Operations tenet of Restore Essential Services, share similar conceptual 
underpinnings as exhibited through respective sub-tasks of Strengthen the Leadership of 
the World Health Organization, and Support Public Health Programs.  This conceptual 
correlation demonstrates a case for stability operations as a suitable supporting concept 
for Smart Power strategy.    
6. Strategy and Doctrine Disconnects 
The strategy and doctrine disconnect along implied assignments within the whole 
of government approach, specifically through the unbalanced nature of civilian vs. 
military expeditionary capabilities.  The whole of government approach to stability 
operations directs that civilian agencies should have the lead prior to and after combat 
operations, with the military in charge during combat operations.62  These disconnects 
will be explored through the issues of: Civilian agency design, and lead agency 
imperative.   
Executing the whole of government approach for a stability operation implies that 
the civilians are sharing the operating environment, including inherent risks, with the 
soldiers.  Civilian agencies are not only under resourced for this task (this issue will be 
explored in Chapter IV); they are also not fundamentally designed to be expeditionary.  
Outside the military, government agencies employ nearly all of their personnel in the jobs 
they were hired to do with little excess capacity in the system for training.  On the other 
hand, the military has built in excess capacity designed to enable training and an 
operational tempo similar to that of a fire department, waiting for the fire to break out.  
Training for complex potential missions is a core task of the military, bolstered by an 
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excess capacity of personnel.63  Civilian agencies are not designed to be expeditionary by 
training or personnel sourcing.  For example, civilian employees of the Department of 
Agriculture have no institutional training to work in a potentially violent environment, as 
they are instead trained to work in among farms and factories.  Further, someone looking 
to work in a potentially dangerous environment would likely not join the Agriculture 
Department in the first place, opting instead to join the military.  These points illustrate 
the fact that a whole of government approach is impossible without significant 
restructuring of government civilian agencies to make them expeditionary and increase 
their capacity to include training for a complex mission set.  It also exposes the 
fundamental flaw in stability operations doctrine:  Who should be in charge of an 
operation? 
If the military is the only agency designed and resourced to operate in the austere 
environment of a stability operation, then how, as stability doctrine assumes, can it be 
expected to be in a supporting role?  Operational support implies that some other agency 
is the lead element responsible for the overall mission.  Doctrinally, the military has 
assumed a supporting role often depicted as interim support or initial tasks designed to 
hold the line until the civilian experts can arrive and take the lead.  This approach is 
dangerously flawed because the civilian agencies cannot adequately deploy to a stability 
operation, much less assume a leading role.  Military support to a stability operation, 
within the whole of government concept, is flawed because it assumes civilian agencies 
will fulfill an expeditionary role, a task they are not up to.   
It is my contention that these disconnects represent an inchoate policy foundation, 
a situation that will be tougher to solve in the coming years due to fiscal resource 
challenges.  Yet, the disconnects between national security strategy and stability 
operations doctrine will lessen as the respective organizations fall in line with national 
directives, and address the problems identified in this section.  This assertion is based on 
the presumption that successive national security strategies remain consistent with the 
tenets of Smart Power, and do not regress to deemphasizing stability operations.   
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C. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter argued that a consistent correlation between National Security 
Strategy tenets and stability operations doctrine will prompt the Army to recognize 
stability operations as a permanent mission-set and create the imperative to internalize 
full spectrum operations doctrine.  This assertion is based on the historical analysis of 
Post-Cold War national security strategies and the resultant ideals internalized.  This 
chapter further asserted that Smart Power maintains a sufficient conceptual structure, 
even with unresolved supporting structures, to impresses upon the Army the requirement 
to internalize stability operations doctrine.  This assertion is based on the strong 
demonstrated linkages between the two concepts that should allow the supporting policy 
foundations to mature.   
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III. OPERATIONALIZING FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 
This chapter will first examine the resolutions that created and promulgated the 
full spectrum policy framework, as the basis for the doctrine.  Next, this chapter will 
explore the decision points that comprised the force structure and training methodologies 
for operationalizing full spectrum doctrine.  Finally this chapter will critique the 
methodology the Army has chosen to achieve proficiency in, and balance among, the 
distinct tasks inherent to full spectrum operations. This will be accomplished by 
evaluating the amalgamation of policy framework and training methodology as it applies 
to two broad areas: training and organizational focus.   
A. THE POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 
This thesis has previously argued that a National Security Strategy advocating the 
principles of stability operations increases the likelihood of the doctrine being 
internalized.  This section will examine subordinate policies that shape full spectrum 
operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into a comprehensive concept.  This 
common policy framework must exist in order to trigger the requirement for the Army to 
operationalize full spectrum operations.  It has evolved through a series of decision points 
expressed through documents of various functions that enable different components of 
the Department of Defense to proceed with the operationalizing process.  This section 
will show how DoD Directive 3000.05, The Quadrennial Defense Review, and The 
National Military Strategy, have been articulated to create the policy framework and by 
extension the imperative to operationalize full spectrum operations.  This section will 
also show how the whole of government approach has conceptual flaws in the policy 
framework that will inhibit the operationalizing of the doctrine.   
1. The Department of Defense—Policy Framework 
DoD Directive 3000.5 Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and 
Reconstruction Operations was born out of a need to fundamentally change the way the 
military interacted with the other elements of national power as evidenced by the 
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shortcomings in Iraq.64 DoD Directive 3000.05 set the organizational heading by making 
stability operations a core mission of the Defense Department and equal in precedence 
with combat operations.  This equality was directed to be extended in terms of doctrine, 
organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, 
and planning.   
The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is seen as the seminal document in the 
DoD because it directs priorities in force structure, modernization plans, and the 
budget.65   The 2010 QDR emphasizes stability operations in particular, and stability 
precepts such as: a commitment to the whole of government, building partner nation 
capacity, and developing leaders for the complexities of full spectrum operations among 
its signature initiatives.66  These initiatives set the conditions for the services to begin to 
integrate these precepts into the future visions for their organizations.   
The National Military Strategy (NMS) is the military’s plan for directing the 
defense of the U.S., by operationalizing the National Security Strategy.  The 2011 NMS 
calls for the military “to serve in an enabling capacity to help other nations achieve 
security goals that can advance common interests,” goals derived directly from Smart 
Power Strategy.67  The NMS further directs the military’s land components, the Army 
and Marine Corps, to be full spectrum capable, with the implicit task of being able to 
conduct stability operations.   
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has further articulated these DoD policies by 
emphasizing the role of stability operations though informal guidance.  In addressing the 
Association of the United States Army in 2007, Secretary Gates recognized the 
challenges associated with bringing the Army back up to standard in high intensity 
combat skills that had atrophied during the prolonged counterinsurgency campaigns in 
Iraq and Afghanistan. He also went on to expand on the need to maintain the hard-won 
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skills of interacting with the civilian population and enabling the host nation government, 
skills he contends will be the most important aspect of future military interventions.  
Secretary Gates articulated his intent of how he views success stating that it “will be less 
a matter of imposing one’s will and more a function of shaping behavior—of friends, 
adversaries, and most importantly, the people in between.”68  Thus through formal policy 
and informal guidance, the DoD has set the requirement for the Army to operationalize 
stability operations while maintaining the combat skills necessary to win conventional 
wars.  
2. The Whole of Government—Policy Framework 
National Security Presidential Directive-44 has directed the Department of state to 
be the lead element in stability and reconstruction efforts, and this task is fulfilled by the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).69  NSPD-44 is a 
policy from the George W. Bush presidency that has been informally extended, as the 
Obama administration works on a new policy paradigm.  Doctrinal processes for a whole 
of government approach to stability and reconstruction are in place to guide the planning 
and execution of an operation, however key policy issues remain untouched.  The whole 
of government approach set the stage for a myriad of decisions that must be adjudicated 
at a policy level.  From this standpoint the most important decisions yet to be made 
involve exactly how the Department of Defense will support Department of State led 
stability and reconstruction operations.  These points arise from the requirement to 
resource and build capacity in both the military and civilian sectors of government that 
satisfy the new requirements of stability operations without causing a duplication of 
effort.  Military experts insist that in order for the military services to properly resource 
stability operations they must first understand what their civilian counterparts are 
bringing to the stability operation table, conversely the civilian agencies involved insist 
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that they require an understanding of what the military is planning on providing.70  
Interagency resource planning is thus a fundamental source of policy disconnect 
hindering the operationalizing of full spectrum doctrine. 
3. The Army Policy Framework 
The Army has implemented full spectrum operations as the conceptual basis for 
operationalizing the DoD requirement to place stability operations on par with combat 
operations.71  Operationalizing full spectrum operations means achieving proficiency and 
readiness in, and balance among, the distinctly different skill sets for conducting offense, 
defense and stability operations.  In addition to the formal doctrine embodied by Field 
Manual 3-0 Full Spectrum Operations, and Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations, 
Army leaders have articulated their policy framework by casting full spectrum operations 
in the greater context of how the Army will operate.  Complementing Secretary Gates’ 
vision, Army Chief of Staff General George Casey has articulated four roles for land 
forces in the twenty-first century that will inform how the Army operationalizes full 
spectrum operations. 
[P]revail in protracted counterinsurgency campaigns; engage to help other 
nations build capacity and to assure friends and allies; support civil 
authorities at home and abroad; deter and defeat hybrid threats and hostile 
state actors.72  
In order to operationalize full spectrum operations, the Army has decided to 
formalize two broad areas of operational responsibilities: combined arms maneuver, and 
wide area security.  General Dempsey, commander of the Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) further articulated these areas of responsibility as the conceptual 
basis of full spectrum operations:  
1. Army forces conduct combined arms maneuver to gain physical, temporal, 
and psychological advantages over enemy organizations. Applying an 
expanded understanding of combined arms, Army forces integrate the 
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combat power resident in the Army’s six warfighting functions with a 
wide array of related civil and military capabilities to defeat enemies and 
seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.  
2. Army forces conduct wide area security to consolidate gains, stabilize 
environments, and ensure freedom of movement and action. Wide area 
security operations protect forces, populations, infrastructures, and 
activities, predominantly in protracted counterinsurgency, relief, and 
reconstruction efforts, and sustained engagement focused on the 
development of partner capabilities.73 
These areas of responsibility outline full spectrum operations doctrine within the 
context of the supporting policies.  These two areas, as the conceptual bridge between the 
supporting policies and the doctrinal foundations of full spectrum operations, represent 
the basis for operationalizing the doctrine of full spectrum operations.  
B. ARMY METHODOLOGIES FOR OPERATIONALIZING FULL 
SPECTRUM OPERATIONS 
The decision points embodied by the policy framework have set the stage for the 
Army to operationalize full spectrum operations by integrating it into the operational 
paradigm.  This section will evaluate the methodology the Army has selected to achieve 
proficiency in, and balance among the distinct tasks inherent to the broad mission set of 
full spectrum operations.  First, this section will articulate the roles of the organizations 
responsible for operationalizing Army doctrine.  Next this section will examine how full 
spectrum operations doctrine is promulgated through the various Army training centers, 
including the proposed methodology for achieving readiness at any point in the spectrum.  
This section will discuss the Army’s progress in operationalizing full spectrum operations 
and evaluate if this effort has enabled stability operations doctrine to be internalized.    
1. Army Organizational Roles 
Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) has the responsibility of drafting 
doctrine, conceiving training methodologies and, through an extensive network of 
schools and training centers, implementing a standardized training regime.  Forces 
Command (FORSCOM) by virtue of being responsible for the maneuver training centers 
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is responsible for fostering the operationalizing of doctrine.  FORSCOM operates three 
major maneuver training centers, the National Training Center (NTC) at Ft. Irwin, the 
Joint Readiness Training Center at Ft. Polk, and the Joint Multinational Readiness Center 
(JMRC) at Hohenfels, Germany.  Active duty and select Army Reserve and National 
Guard units from throughout the Army rotate into these training centers for a multi-week 
training event that is designed to focus units on specific mission requirements.  Each 
training center is staffed by an opposing force simulating a thinking enemy and a staff of 
observer controllers who mentor leaders at all levels on doctrinal approaches to their 
assigned mission.  The units in training are immersed into a simulated operational 
environment that is designed to closely parallel real world deployments, where they must 
complete missions that involve defeating the opposing force and working closely with the 
civilian population.73  This constructive training environment forms the basis for 
operationalizing doctrine.  It is the ultimate responsibility of the individual unit 
commander to operationalize doctrine within the conditions of the mission environment.  
Unit commanders are specifically responsible for operationalizing the simultaneous 
execution of the three elements of full spectrum operations.74  Operationalization of 
doctrine is inherent to the two main responsibilities of a unit commander: Mission 
command, and readiness.   
Mission command obligates the unit commander to articulate guidance from 
which operational plans and subordinate initiative flows.75  Mission command requires 
the commander to grasp standardized doctrinal precepts and operationalize them to the 
mission environment using formal orders and informal guidance.     
Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the 
commander and the commander's staff to integrate the warfighting 
functions using the operations process and mission orders to accomplish 
successful full-spectrum operations. Mission command enables agile and 
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adaptive leaders and organizations to execute disciplined initiative within 
commander’s intent as part of unified action in a complex and ambiguous 
environment. Mission command is critical to Army forces’ ability to 
develop the situation through action and seize, retain, and exploit the 
initiative.76  
Readiness embodies the commander’s responsibilities of training and mission 
preparedness.   Readiness, or the units’ ability to perform a given mission set, is another 
primary responsibility of the commander that requires operationalization of doctrine.  
Commanders direct training through a standardized methodology, that sets the tasks to be 
trained, the conditions under which those tasks will be trained, and the required 
standards.77  The commander, as the enforcer of training standards, has the responsibility 
for ensuring that the unit has sufficiently operationalized doctrine and is ready to 
accomplish a given mission.     
2. The Army’s Training Strategy  
The training strategy for full spectrum operations is framed by the Army Force 
Generation Model (ARFORGEN) and informed by the concept of “Aim Point” to meet 
the overall Army training goals.  The goal of the Army training strategy is to train all 
units to a T2 standard on full spectrum tasks, prior to their maneuver training center 
rotation, and then to a T1 standard before deployment.78    
ARFORGEN is a model that is designed to provide trained and ready forces for 
employment on a cyclical schedule through three phases:  Reset, Train/Ready, and 
Available.  Reset units have recently returned or otherwise cycled off of available status, 
and are receiving personnel and equipment and focusing on training individual and 
collective tasks.  Train/ready stage units are those undergoing intensive collective 
training in anticipation of deployment.  Available units are ready to deploy or deployed in 
support of ongoing worldwide operations.  This process frames the training strategy for 
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full spectrum operations because it forces units in the train/ready phase to focus on a 
specific mission set.  The ARFORGEN process calls for most of the Army’s brigade 
combat teams, the Army’s tactical unit of employment, to conduct two maneuver center 
rotations during the train/ready phase of each cycle. The first rotation seeks to develop 
training proficiency across the entire spectrum of operations by training for offense, 
defense, and stability operations.  Brigade commanders are directed to narrow their focus 
onto specific core competency tasks, including those necessary for full spectrum 
operations, nine months prior to deployment or prior to the second training center 
rotation.79  The second rotation occurs prior to the available phase and focuses on an 
assigned mission, in theory the anticipated portion of the spectrum the unit will be 
operating in.  The Army training strategy, by progressively narrowing the focus of 
training among BCTs over the train/ready phase of ARFORGEN, aims to build a force 
trained and available for a variety of missions sets across the spectrum of operations.80   
 
Figure 2.   The Army’s Force Generation Model ARFORGEN 
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Underlying the training strategy is the precept that, due to the complexity of the 
tasks involved, a unit cannot expect to achieve a high degree of readiness across the 
entire spectrum of operations simultaneously.   Therefore, units must seek to achieve a 
higher degree of readiness in a few mission sets (i.e., high intensity combat, or 
counterinsurgency) and assume risk in not achieving as high of a degree of readiness in 
other mission sets.  To inform this concept of risk, the Army has established an aim point, 
or a reference for focusing effort in the train/ready phase.  The concept of aim point, as 
depicted in Figure 3, can be summarized as the training priority that the Army intends on 
giving each sector of the spectrum of conflict in order to generate maximum operational 
readiness across the force.81  The aim point reflects the current unbalanced realities of a 
force that has been defined by an operating environment of counterinsurgency and 
stability operations as experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan.  By placing the aim point  
further to the right, the Army is making the case for rebalancing the force by focusing 
more on conventional major combat operations (traditional offense/defense operations) in 
a broader effort to operationalize full spectrum operations.  This rebalancing could be 
problematic for the internalization of stability operations.    
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Figure 3.   The Army’s Aim Point Strategy 
3. The Army’s Training Strategy for Stability Operations     
Training for stability operations is unique in that it requires specialized individual 
and unit training that exceeds a simple task list and instead emphasizes cultural 
awareness and multilateral cooperative efforts.  Developing the skill set necessary for 
stability operations requires some key leaders to attend years of language and cultural 
training to advise plans and operations.  Even lower ranking soldiers tasked with 
executing stability operations must similarly master a set of skills that incorporates 
cultural nuances, minimal use of force, and a level of civilian engagement.  The stability 
operations skill set is fundamentally different from those necessary to conduct high 
intensity combat operations.  In describing the broad capabilities the Army will likely 
require, TRADOC Pam 525-3-0, The Army Capstone Concept Operational Adaptability 
has identified two broad categories of stability tasks: Provide wide area security, and 
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develop the host nation’s capacity for governance.82  These areas represent a metric for 
thinking about future operations however, the Army’s ample experience with stability 
operations in the recent past offers guide posts for operationalizing stability operations.    
The Army has an institutional basis for holistically training stability operations 
extending back to the 1990s when brigade combat teams cycled through the maneuver 
training centers en route to executing stability centric operations in the Balkans and Haiti.  
The training model for one 1994 JRTC rotation of 2nd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, 
involved training leaders and unit skills systematically within the exercise construct.83  
Leader “stability” skills were honed by attending meetings with simulated NGOs and 
local government officials (played by role players) where they had to coordinate 
operations with the overall political priorities of the mission, such as providing security 
for a humanitarian relief convoy.  Line units were tasked with executing vehicle 
checkpoints and searching houses for weapons, honing techniques that would not alienate 
the simulated local civilian population.   Essential to this effort was the establishment of 
measures of effectiveness, designed to give the commander a metric to determine if his 
efforts were succeeding in stabilizing the area.  The 2nd Brigade staff focused in on items 
such as cease fire violations, hostile contact with U.S. or friendly forces, and refugee flow 
to construct their measures of effectiveness.  The training constructs of JRTC represent 
the final step in a multi-month training cycle that focused on training the nuances of 
stability operations to a conventional infantry brigade.  The concepts developed during 
these training evolutions, when merged with the implied requirements of provide wide 
area security, and develop the host nation’s capacity for governance, serve as a guideline 
for operationalizing stability operations doctrine.  
Training for stability operations further requires a comprehensive approach, or a 
holistic application of national power and influence, to increase the legitimacy of the host 
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nation government in the eyes of its citizens.84  For the Army, this implies integrating 
other U.S. government executive agencies and select non-government organizations into 
training and preparation for stability operations.  The Army partially addresses this issue 
by emphasizing the need to develop more adaptive leaders capable of operating in 
ambiguous circumstances and in support of non-military organizations.85  Training 
scenarios further use civilians to interact with training units to staff working groups and 
simulate working with civilian experts to prepare for specific tasks and ease the civilian-
military cultural barriers.86  This civilian participation is represented by role-players that 
leverage their personal experience to augment the training scenarios, they are however 
not the actual civilians that the soldiers will be working with while deployed in support of 
stability operations.  This lack of true representation in training environments is a product 
of limited expeditionary capacity in civilian partner agencies.  Lack of expeditionary 
capacity in civilian agencies results in operations being staffed by ad hoc teams that 
introduce themselves to each other on the first day.      
C. EVALUATION OF THE ARMY’S OPERATIONALIZING STRATEGY  
In evaluating Army efforts at operationalizing full spectrum, this section will 
critique the amalgamation of policy framework and training methodology as it applies to 
two broad areas: training and organizational focus.  
1. Training 
Training is the gateway to operationalizing full spectrum operations, and this 
section will critique the ARFORGEN methodology for producing trained Army 
formations to determine if they promote or inhibit the operationalizing of full spectrum 
doctrine.  The Army has developed a sound full spectrum training strategy, implemented 
through a rigorous training program at the various combat training centers.  This strategy 
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is grounded in using the maneuver training centers to enhance best practices and assist 
the unit commanders in certifying units before they deploy.  The methodology of 
refocusing the BCT training regime nine months prior to deployment however, discounts 
the suddenness with which the need to conduct stability operations can arise (i.e., the 
recent Haiti earthquake response in 2010.)  The rigid timelines associated with the 
ARFORGEN process, to enable the operational requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan, 
optimize the production of counterinsurgency and stability capable units but inhibit the 
production of full spectrum capable units.  Until the Army can figure out a way to train 
the entire spectrum during one training rotation, it will be forced to train units on only 
one part of the spectrum.   
Furthermore, operationalizing the comprehensive approach poses difficulties 
more difficult to overcome because, they involve resourcing organizations outside the 
Department of Defense.  Building capacity in civilian and nongovernmental partner 
agencies sufficient to operationalize the comprehensive approach remains outside the 
control of the Department of Defense, yet it undercuts the necessary axiom of training as 
you fight/ stabilize.  This subject will be explored in depth in Chapter IV. 
2. Organizational Focus 
The Army’s organizational focus, or what it chooses to doctrinally emphasize and 
stress in training, is a critical factor in how full spectrum operations are operationalized.  
This focus can be evaluated through the quandary inherent in the Army’s aim point 
concept.  Currently the Army is organizationally focused on the counterinsurgency and 
stability portions of the spectrum, as required by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  As 
evidenced by the aim point model in Figure 3, the Army is attempting to refocus the 
organization on the higher intensity portion of the spectrum to mitigate the risk of being 
unprepared conduct conventional operations.  Setting an organizational focus that 
operationalizes all areas of the spectrum of conflict, while rebalancing the force as called 
for by the aim point concept is a challenge for Army leadership.  This challenge is being 
met through an organizational focus on leader development.   
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The Army has a crop of leaders that is well versed in counterinsurgency and 
stability operations, and wants to create leaders that are proficient in all areas of the 
spectrum.  To this end, in 2004 Army Chief of Staff General Peter Schoomaker, coined 
the phrase “pentathlete leader,” connoting that the Army would need well rounded 
leaders to operationalize the concept that would come to be full spectrum operations 
doctrine.  The pentathlete leader concept aims to build leaders that are: skilled in 
maneuver warfare, familiar with regional and cultural nuances, diplomacy attuned, and 
capable of leading large organizations.87  The Army has taken strides to internalize this 
concept, producing results such as enlarging the Foreign Area Officer program, and 
creating a retention program that offers a graduate school option that requires officers to 
study international relations.  
The imperative to build the pentathlete leader, by creating well rounded soldier-
statesmen, and the requirement  to balance the aim point, by creating specialists in 
maneuver warfare, are coming into conflict.  Incoming Chief of Staff General Martin 
Dempsey summed up this quandary and charted a way ahead:  
What do you do with this magnificent Army of ours when Iraq and 
Afghanistan are in the rear view? The Army needs to decide which five 
things—not 55 things—its soldiers are going to master.  If we make 
leaders skilled in a few areas, they’ll have the confidence to adapt when 
we inevitably get the future wrong, but if you’re not a master of anything, 
you have no confidence in anything.88 
Dempsey made these comments during Unified Quest 2011, an exercise charged 
with operationalizing full spectrum operations. They are based on the premise that full 
spectrum operations are too complex for any one person to master.  The Army’s 
circumspect approach to bridging the conceptual gap between leaders who can 
satisfactorily operationalize the entire spectrum, and leaders capable of expertly 
operationalizing part of the spectrum, seems to question the basis of a general purpose 
force lead by pentathletes.  Thus, my assertion is that the Army is suffering from a lack of 
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organizational focus and will continue to do so until the conflict between the aim point 
imperative and the pentathlete leader, and the root causes therein are resolved.  Until 
resolved, this lack of organizational focus will encumber efforts to operationalize full 
spectrum doctrine.         
As demonstrated by the highlighted deficiencies in the ARFORGEN process, and 
the conceptual foundation issues with the full spectrum formations, the process of 
operationalizing full spectrum operations faces numerous challenges that must be 
addressed at the highest levels.  
D. CONCLUSIONS 
Operationalizing full spectrum operations is integral to the success of 
internalizing stability operations.  This chapter explored and evaluated Army efforts at 
operationalizing full spectrum operations as an enabler for internalizing the doctrine.  
Despite significant challenges, the Army has made strides towards operationalizing full 
spectrum doctrine.  The process of operationalizing the doctrine has exposed significant 
issues in the concept of full spectrum operations, namely the intellectual deficiencies in 
the whole of government approach, the Army’s institutional preference for high intensity 
combat operations, and the unsettled conceptual basis for force structure.  By evaluating 
the Army’s pursuit of operationalizing full spectrum operations, this chapter forms the 
basis for Chapter IV’s examination of the cultural and institutional barriers to the 
internalization of stability operations doctrine.   
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IV. CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO 
INTERNALIZATION 
In addition to correlating the national security strategy and operationalizing the 
concept, the Army must overcome several other challenges before full spectrum 
operations doctrine can be internalized.  This chapter will expand on findings of the 
previous chapters to identify and analyze the Army’s internal challenges to internalizing 
full spectrum doctrine, posed by conceptual and institutional barriers, and structure them 
as decision points that must be overcome.  Framing this analysis are the following two 
challenges:  1) How can the Army execute stability operations when the other concerned 
government agencies lack the necessary capability to execute a whole of government 
approach?   2) Which internal biases must be overcome to implement a full spectrum 
capable force, as a requirement for internalizing stability operations?  Integral to both of 
these challenges is an understanding of the Army’s desired end-state for institutionalizing 
stability operations capabilities, and the conceptual shortcomings of the whole of 
government approach, both of which will be explored in this chapter.  This chapter will 
link the two challenges with the Army’s internal decision points and offer analysis of 
those decisions that will enable the successful internalization of full spectrum operations 
in the Army. 
A. INSTITUTIONALIZING VS. INTERNALIZING 
These two distinct terms, institutionalizing and internalizing, represent 
organizational goals with direct bearing on this thesis.  Institutionalizing a concept 
denotes the creation of institutional processes and structures that, when amalgamated 
create a force capability, in this case the ability to conduct stability operations.  
Internalization of a concept specifies a cultural integration of stability operations 
represented by organizational attitudinal responses in the execution of full spectrum 




operations capabilities, as represented by institutionalizing, and internalizing a cultural 
acceptance of stability operations precepts, within the hierarchy of full spectrum 
operations, is significant.  
1. Institutionalizing 
The Army has set a goal of “focusing, integrating, and institutionalizing stability 
operations capabilities” to achieve a full-spectrum-capable force.89  According to the 
Army’s action plan for stability operations, achieving this capability specifically means:  
Focus, integrate, and institutionalize Army activities to improve the 
Army’s capability and capacity to conduct Stability Operations in a joint, 
interagency and multinational environment.  Direct the development of 
DOTMLPF solutions that positively impact the Army’s ability to 
effectively conduct stability operations.90 
Implicit in the institutionalizing process is the enhancement of the Army’s 
capability and capacity to conduct stability operations.  Generating capability and 
capacity are concepts significant to the process of institutionalizing full spectrum 
operations.  Capacity connotes a basic ability, typically correlating to unit force structure, 
including size, and composition.  Capability expands on capacity, adding modernization, 
unit readiness, and sustainability to the conceptual construct.91  According to Joint 
Publication 1-02, military capability unites these four components to define a unit’s 
ability to achieve a specified wartime objective, the term predating the advent of full 
spectrum doctrine.   
DOTMLPF is the Army’s structure for institutionalizing capabilities through an 
acronym representing:  Doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership, personnel, 
and facilities (Figure 4.)  This framework incorporates all of the major categories that 
must be addressed in order to realize a new capability within the Army.  In reference to 
the emerging capability of stability operations, this thesis has previously addressed the 
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categories of doctrine, organization, and training.  Doctrinal evolution has been an 
ongoing process that fulfilled its DOTMLPF integration with the publications of Field 
Manual 3-0 Full Spectrum Operations, and Field Manual 3-07 Stability Operations.  As 
explored in Chapter II, the discrepancy between the whole of government approach and 
the inadequate resourcing of other government agencies, has left stability operations 
doctrine intellectually undeveloped.  This discrepancy has further consequences for other 
aspects of internalizing stability operations into the Army that will be addressed in 
forthcoming sections.  Organizationally, the Army has elected to generate a stability 
operations capability through maintaining the current general purpose force structure, as 
opposed to creating a specialized stability force.  The training regime for stability 
operations has matured with the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, creating a 
foundation from which to generate stability operations capability.  Material and facilities 
will undergo minimal change in this process because force structure will remain constant.  
Institutionalizing stability operations capability will fall into the categories of leadership 
and education, the very areas where organizational biases and cultural norms are formed 
and maintained.    
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Figure 4.   The Army’s DOTMLPF Model92 
2. Internalization 
Organizationally internalizing full spectrum operations requires the modification 
of organizational biases and cultural norms to produce attitudinal responses towards 
stability operations within the full spectrum hierarchy.  Generating full spectrum 
capability within the DOTMLPF domain means a fundamental shift in the methodology 
of developing leaders and subordinate personnel.  This process of internalization goes 
above and beyond the creation of processes and structures as outlined in DOTMLPF, and 
into the realm of organizational cognitive adjustment.  Internalizing full spectrum 
operations will require an organizational evolution to a “stability ethic,” a concept 
articulated by Lieutenant Colonel Jeff Calvert, a Civil Affairs officer with broad 
operational experience in stability operations: 
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Even more fundamental and important than teaching specific stability 
skills is to find a way to make stability part of the basic thought processes 
of every soldier.  This “stability ethic” must go beyond just teaching 
soldiers the Law of War and the current Rules of Engagement.  It is about 
the tone and nature of every interaction they have with civilian elements in 
the area of operations, and it is about maintaining a basic attitude of 
respect for the indigenous population and institutions (IPI) in the face of 
the ambiguities that are always present in full spectrum operations.  And 
the most difficult part—it must do this without subverting the soldiers’ 
skills, instincts and readiness to use deadly force as needed to accomplish 
the mission.93   
This “stability ethic” embodies the internalization of full spectrum operations 
because it addresses the basic soldier thought process, and the place of stability 
operations in the operational hierarchy. 
3. The Army’s Raison D'être 
As stated in the introduction, in internalizing full spectrum operations, the Army 
faces two challenges:  Overcoming capabilities shortfalls created by inchoate whole of 
government approach, and modifying organizational biases and norms to develop a 
stability ethic.  Of these two challenges, the latter poses the most significant test.  This is 
because the Army has rarely had to foster a fundamental cultural shift in consideration of 
its existential identity, or primary reason for being.  Organizationally the Army has 
undergone noteworthy readjustments, a prime example being the post-Vietnam War 
period.  This timeframe was underscored by a significant refocusing on the Soviet threat, 
buoyed by the new doctrine of AirLand Battle, including revolutionary training methods 
in the National Training Center, and the inclusion of the After Action Review.94  These 
adjustments began the process of modifying organizational biases and norms, yet the 
Army’s focus remained fighting and winning the nation’s wars.95  Because DoD 
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Directive 3000.5 modified the Army’s raison d'être to include the execution of stability 
operations, it requires a concerted effort that exceeds the combination of processes and 
structure, institutionalization effort, and extends into the uncharted territory of developing 
a stability ethic.  The forthcoming challenges should thus be contextualized within the 
imperative not only to effect changes to the institutional structure and processes, but to 
internalize a new attitudinal response to operating in a full spectrum environment.    
B. RECONCILING STABILITY OPERATIONS AND THE WHOLE OF 
GOVERNMENT 
The whole of government approach to stability operations operates directs that 
civilian agencies should have the lead prior to and after combat operations, with the 
military in charge during combat operations.96  Operationalizing this collaborative effort 
requires two components: innovative doctrine, and properly resourced agencies.  In the 
case of stability operations, under resourced civilian agencies have disrupted the 
formation of comprehensive doctrine, causing the entire enterprise to defer to military 
direction.  This reality leads to a question:  How can the Army execute stability 
operations, when the other concerned government agencies lack the capacity to execute a 
true whole of government approach? 
1. Organization         
According to the National Security Presidential Directive-44, the State 
Department has the responsibility to “coordinate and lead integrated United States 
Government efforts, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction 
activities.”97 The State Department has further delegated these responsibilities to the 
Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS.)  To this end, the 
S/CRS is comprised of an interagency staff responsible for coordinating across the whole 
of government, and a deployable Civilian Response Corps (CRC) designed to integrate  
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civilian and military components on the scene of a stability operation.98  These civilian 
entities are designed to interface with the military, and specifically the Army structure, at 
the Combatant Command staff levels.99    
2. Innovative Doctrine 
The first step in operationalizing the whole of government approach to stability 
operations is developing new doctrine.  Relevant doctrine is encapsulated by three key 
documents, and one process, collectively referred to in a RAND corporation study as the 
four pillars of rethinking the interagency process, outlined in Table 1.100 
Table 1.   The Intellectual Foundations of the Interagency Process 
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These documents represent a collaborative foundation for implementing the 
whole of government approach to stability operations.  The Interagency Management 
System allows the S/CRS to operationalize this doctrine through the incorporation of a 
decision making body, a planning cell, and a deployable Civilian Response Corps 
(CRC.)101  Working in tangent with each other, these elements of the IMS have the 
potential to harness the doctrine and synchronize civilian-military approaches to stability 
operations.  However, this capstone organization has fallen short of its potential due to 
inadequate funding. 
3. Resourcing  
Sufficient funding for the IMS, although miniscule in terms of the discretionary 
budget, has proven a difficult objective to secure.  Central to the IMS concept, and most 
costly, is the deployable Civilian Response Corps (CRC.)  The CRC is a necessary 
component of any integrated civilian agency coordination effort because they represent 
the civilian boots on the ground of a stability operation.  Thus far CRC funding requests 
have fallen short of enabling the creation of a 250 person deployable pool of qualified 
civilians.  In 2008, Ambassador John E. Herbst, head of the Office of Reconstruction and 
Stabilization, estimated it would cost $248 million to create, and $131 million to sustain 
this capability.102  Three years later, the fiscal year 2011 budget has only specified $184 
million to generate and operate a deployable civilian capability.103  Intermediate budget 
cycles have seen the overall IMS concept augmented by a transfer of funds from Defense 
Department accounts to those of the Department of State.  Eluding to the notion that 
current priorities preclude the proper funding for the whole of government approach, 
Congress has stated that “this provision as a temporary authority to provide additional 
resources, if needed, to the Department of State until S/CRS is fully stood up and 
                                                 
101 Clifton D. Reed, The Battle Within: DOD and Interagency Coordination for Regional Conflicts: 
AFRICOM and the Interagency Management System as Models (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air 
Command and Staff College, 2008), 10. 
102 John E. Herbst, Briefing on Civilian Stabilization Initiative [transcript], February 14, 2008, Merlin, 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/100913.pdf. 
103Casey Frary, “FY11 State Department Budget Summary,” February 1, 2010, American Foreign 
Service Association, http://www.afsa.org/congress/FY11.pdf. 
 57
adequately resourced.”104 These stopgap measures fall short of addressing the problem 
by adequately funding a deployable civilian capability in the State Department.  
Conversely, in 2010 the Department of Defense was funded with $550 million dollars to 
augment foreign internal defense, conduct counter-terror operations, and stability 
operations.105  It is important to note that these funds, unlike those earmarked for the 
civilian agencies, are solely for operations with personnel and support funding being 
drawn from a separate budget line.  This major budgetary inequity between civilian 
agencies and the military underlines the problem that the whole of government approach 
exists in theory and doctrine, but not in capability.  
4. Addressing the Challenge 
The gap in capabilities between civilian government agencies and the military 
will not relieve responsibility from either for executing stability operations.  However, as 
the most conspicuous of U.S. efforts, the military will by default be responsible for a 
successful outcome.  This leads to the first challenge: How can the Army execute 
stability operations when the other concerned government agencies lack the capability to 
execute a true whole of government approach?  It is my assertion that the Army, as the 
largest purveyor of stability operations within the DoD, has employed a hedging strategy.   
This strategy, while continuing to value government civilian input and coordination, 
accounts for the capability gap by developing the resources to accomplish the mission. 
This assertion is substantiated by the 2005 DoD report on institutionalizing stability 
operations within the military: 
Unfortunately, during the last year the progress of other organs of 
Government has been less fulsome, and we cannot have confidence in the 
speed with which changes in other departments and agencies outside DoD 
will take place. Thus we urge that the Department act with dispatch to  
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accelerate the transformation of its own capabilities, while concurrently 
continuing to give full support to the evolution of capabilities elsewhere 
within the Government.106  
Even at this early stage, the DoD predicted the resource shortfalls that would 
define civilian support to stability operations, and that it would be necessary to augment 
stability operations capability by developing them in-house.  Examples of these positions 
include experts in infrastructure management needed to restart or maintain critical 
utilities such as power, water, or sewage; and professionals qualified to train judges and 
police officers, to enable the rule of law.  The Army has two options for attaining these 
skill sets to conduct stability operations:  Harness private civilian expertise via 
contracting, and recruit and retain civilian specialists into the reserve components to 
compliment active component capabilities.   
5. Contracting Support 
Specialized private sector support to a stability operation can be drawn from a 
variety of sources, including foreign and domestic commercial companies, academia, 
government backed research and development centers, private consultants, and Non 
Governmental Organizations.107  Contracting the needed expertise is advantageous 
because it allows for a tailored fit, for example an engineer to fix and maintain an aging 
power grid.  Another advantage is monetary savings accrued by temporarily contracting a 
specific skill set vs. permanently hiring, reducing the myriad of logistical support 
required of a tenured professional.  Further, hiring local professionals disaffected by the 
unstable situation often performing their former jobs, can offer a two-fold benefit by 
infusing the local economy and assisting in the restoration of a critical service.   
Foremost amongst the detractors of hiring civilians is an inability to attract 
qualified personnel to fill the need in a timely fashion.   A recent historical example is the 
post-combat occupation of Iraq, when failed recruiting efforts left critical political and 
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economic advisory posts filled by inexperienced adventure seekers scarcely out of 
college.108  Another downside is the inability to fully integrate contractors, whose 
loyalties lie outside the U.S. government, into the whole of government team.  
Accordingly, it must be asked how much loyalty should contractors be expected to give a 
mission when they are not vested as direct representatives of the U.S. government.   This 
lack of integration can diminish U.S. readiness to conduct a stability operation, because it 
hinders proficiency born of familiarity and repetition as envisioned by the whole of 
government approach.      
6. Growing the Capability 
In line with maintaining a general purpose force capable of conducting operations 
across the spectrum of conflict, the active Army has incrementally increased a number of 
specialty job fields that have a direct correlation to stability operations.  Among the 
specialties that have experienced an increase in numbers over the past twenty years are 
the Civil Affairs branch, and Judge Advocate General Corps.109  Both branches represent 
a marked increase in the Army’s capability to autonomously execute stability operations.  
Increasing capabilities in-house can also be achieved by staffing the reserve components 
with skilled professionals to compliment the skill sets in the active force.  The Defense 
Science Board recommended that the Civil Affairs branch focus on recruiting individuals 
with professional “domain” experience, ages 35–45, and enticing these qualified 
individuals with warrant officer status.110  A model for this can be found in the WWII 
Army program to co-opt qualified individuals into the military, affording them requisite 
rank to execute post-combat occupation duties.  These Military Governors were trained at 
one of 13 Army-run Schools of Military Government to administer occupied territories. 
Because these individuals were drafted on an as needed basis, the challenges associated 
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with recruiting and retaining them was minimized.111  Finally, forecasting the correct mix 
of needed skills in anticipation of what might be needed in a stability operation is a 
thorny proposition, especially in coming times of economic austerity.  
C. IMPLEMENTING A STABILITY ETHIC 
Generating full spectrum capabilities, and specifically stability operations 
capabilities, among the Army’s general purpose force requires the development and 
application of a stability ethic.   Implementing this ethic, to enable a full spectrum 
capable force, faces inherent organizational resistance.  This section will expand on the 
idea of the stability ethic within the context of full spectrum operations, study the sources 
of resistance to a stability ethic as rooted in organizational culture, and examine methods 
for easing it. 
1. Stability Ethic and the Strategic Corporal 
Full spectrum operations require the execution of operations across the spectrum 
of conflict, from high intensity combat to stability operations, necessitating the capability 
to transition among the points within a compressed timeframe.  Stability operations are 
grounded in the credibility among potential enemies that if the situation warrants hostile 
action, the U.S. Army would defeat them.112  These seemingly dichotomous 
characteristics are at the heart of a stability ethic as embodied in the concepts of the three 
block war and the strategic corporal.   
The three block war and the strategic corporal were coined by the former 
Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, General Charles Krulak, to contextualize the 
ambiguous operating environments, and the appropriate actions therein that would come 
to characterize full spectrum operations.  The three block war outlines a simple construct 
that envisions fighting on one block, distributing humanitarian relief on the second, and 
separating warring factions on the third.  Enter into this scenario the strategic corporal, 
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who cannot afford to be lacking in any of the necessary skills to successfully master each 
block.  The Marine Corps is meeting this challenge by integrating cultural awareness into 
the formal education chain for upcoming Marines, requiring them to focus their efforts on 
mastering a culture (including a language) that is predicted to be operationally 
relevant.113   
The Army is developing its own three block war and strategic corporal models via 
the complex paradigm of operational adaptability.114  For the Army, building a strategic 
corporal is akin to implementing a stability ethic, except the Army is a fundamentally 
different organization then the Marine Corps, posing unique challenges to organizational 
change.   
2. Organizational Resistance    
The Army culture is fragmented amongst specialized branches, united by 
common values and an overarching mission.  Individual identities in the Army are 
dictated first by branch affiliation, for example, the Signal Corps or the Infantry, next by 
unit of assignment, and finally by the common bond of soldiering.  Each distinct branch, 
and affiliated soldiers, has an identity derived from a mission set, in précis what soldiers 
are assigned to do determines who they are. Residing at the apex of the branch hierarchy 
is the traditional combat arms, only from which the Chief of Staff and other senior 
generals are selected.  From this culture springs, what Civil Affairs advocate Stephen 
Henthorne calls, a “Warfighter Insurgency” as articulated in his open letter to former 
National Security Advisor, James L. Jones: 
This lack of training is due to a “War Fighter Insurgency” within the U.S. 
Army, which still espouses, although in seemingly subtle ways, kinetic 
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with the fact that truly no one in DOD is paying any attention to a very 
transparent problem, have re-enforced a U.S. Army kinetics first, last, and 
always, approach to operations.115 
This framework of branch identity and hierarchy is united by common values and 
mission integration.   
Army values are nominally represented by the seven Army values:  Loyalty, 
Duty, Respect, Selfless Service, Honor, Integrity, and Personal Courage.  I assert that one 
additional value, professionalism, encompasses the Army in its entirety.  Professionalism 
serves two primary functions for the Army, providing a mandate to operate on behalf of 
the nation directly leading to the responsibility to effect necessary changes in the 
operational paradigm.  The Army has a professional mandate afforded by the nation to 
provide for the common defense.116  Inherent in this mandate, rooted in the Constitution, 
dictates that as professional organization the Army will be granted a great deal of 
autonomy and latitude to provide for the common defense.  In exchange for that 
autonomy, the Army will nurture professional ethics and standards in line with the overall 
national values.117  This mandate is the source of the professionalism embraced as a 
common value throughout the branches that comprise the organizational culture of the 
Army.  As a professional organization the Army must change to adapt to new operational 
realities, i.e., the requirement to execute full spectrum operations, or risk failing the 
mandate of the nation.118  Maintaining institutional expertise in the operational art of 
national security is the definition of professionalism for the Army.  Adding the new 
paradigm of stability operations to the required tasks for the Army will pose a challenge 
that a professional force will need to meet head on.     
                                                 
115 Stephen Henthorne, “Open Letter to National Security Advisor, General James L. Jones, USMC 
(Ret’d),” August, 16, 2009, paragraph 7, 
http://communities.canada.com/ottawacitizen/blogs/defencewatch/archive/2009/09/11/u-s-army-fails-to-
connect-with-the-afghan-people-for-long-term-stability-says-nato-civil-military-affairs-advisor.aspx. 
116 Moris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free 
Press, 1971): 27. 
117 Edgar Schein, “The Role of the Founder in Creating Organizational Culture,” Organizational 
Dynamics (Summer, 1983): 27. 
118 Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985) 18. 
 63
The requirement to perform full spectrum operations, and in particular stability 
operations, will not be hindered by a lack of professional zeal to adapt and overcome; it 
will instead be sapped by lack of organizational identity.  Because the Army is culturally 
segregated by branch and specialty, and by design the Army is going to approach full 
spectrum operations with the same general propose forces needed to conduct traditional 
combat missions, stability operations are at a cultural disadvantage of being internalized 
into the Army.   
3. Decision Points 
Creating a stability ethic will require adapting the roots of organizational biases 
and cultural norms in leadership and education.  Changing leadership involves a two-fold 
process: first, selecting general officers who have proven full spectrum operation 
proficiency, and second growing strategic corporals capable of succeeding in the three 
block war.  Both efforts require an emphasis within the Army’s educational system to 
foster a stability ethic     
a. Leadership 
Incoming Army Chief of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey, stated that 
“soldiers and leaders emulate the behavior of those senior to them.”119  As the 
institutional decision makers, general officers shape the direction of the Army and 
shoulder an inordinate amount of responsibility for operational successes.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Paul Yingling, a noted Army soldier-scholar, described the role of general 
officers this way: 
The general is responsible for estimating the likelihood of success in 
applying force to achieve the aims of policy. The general describes both 
the means necessary for the successful prosecution of war and the ways in  
which the nation will employ those means. If the policymaker desires ends 
                                                 
119 Martin Dempsey, “Gen. Dempsey Discusses the Army Profession,” TRADOC Youtube Video 
Channel, June 2010, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcVHwpqsLf8&feature=relmfu. 
 64
for which the means he provides are insufficient, the general is responsible 
for advising the statesman of this incongruence.120 
Full spectrum operations require general officers to be grounded in the 
ways and means of prosecuting a three block war, implying an innate understanding of 
stability operations doctrine.  Selection of brigadier generals with demonstrated full 
spectrum credentials offers an “interim” opportunity to institutionalize stability 
operations because these leaders will shape Army for the coming decade.  The 2008 
brigadier general promotion board symbolized an institutional crossroads because it 
involved the selection of H. R. McMaster, a colonel who had come to identify with full 
spectrum operations, and felt that the Army was moving away from institutionalizing it.  
His selection, overseen by General David Petraeus, himself an officer who was termed as 
successfully demonstrating full spectrum abilities, was seen as a bellwether in the 
institutional acceptance of full spectrum operations and by extension stability doctrine.121  
Interim solutions, such as promoting the right generals, must be bolstered 
by growing an officer corps of full spectrum operationally capable strategic corporals.  
Among the DOTMLPF domains, changing the personnel system is the most critical for 
internalizing stability operations in the officer corps.  The personnel bureaucracy has 
been accused of nurturing a zero-defect mentality that stifles innovation and by default 
rewards conformists who come to represent the “warfighter insurgency.”122  In a 
critiquing the Army personnel system of the Vietnam era, scholars Paul Savage and 
Richard Gabriel, focused on the overall disintegration of the system, resulting in a lower 
quality officer.123  This disintegration was exemplified by the practices of, “ticket 
punching” and “time in rank requirements.”  Unfortunately these two practices have 
persisted in the Army and are likely to stifle the internalization of a stability ethic.  Ticket 
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punching dictates holding specific qualifying jobs at designated ranks as a requirement of 
promotion; while time in rank requirements ensures that all personnel are promoted at 
generally the same time throughout their careers, with no one eligible for promotion to 
general officer prior to 22 years of service.  Ticket punching encourages officers to 
pursue a narrow range of jobs as designated by their career fields for advancement 
reducing emphasis on a depth of experiences as demanded by the three block war.  Time 
in rank requirements discriminate against the brightest officers, specifically those who 
demonstrate the mental dexterity for full spectrum operations.  This leaves them unable to 
excel past the bureaucracy to exert influence at higher levels of responsibility, and more 
likely to exit military service short of their potential.124 Modifying these two practices of 
the personnel system to encourage depth of experiences and ensure a faster rise to the top 
for the most talented officers are two steps in the direction of growing the strategic 
corporal officer corps. 
b. Education 
Co-equal with selecting and retaining the right leaders is equipping them 
with the tools to instill attitudinal responses to full spectrum operations within their 
organizations.  Of the three responses, motor, verbal, and attitudinal, that signal an 
internalization of spectrum operations, and in turn stability operations doctrine, the 
attitudinal response is the hardest to achieve.  In review, motor responses include testable 
skills that ascribe to a standard, such as rifle marksmanship or language proficiency.  
Verbal responses encompass a demonstrated understanding of procedures or culture 
understanding.  Attitudinal responses, sit atop the hierarchy, and include a demonstrated 
understanding of how a given concept fits within the larger scope of policy and 
strategy.125 Leader education is the practical path to instilling attitudinal responses to 
stability operations doctrine within organizations and culture as a whole.   
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Education stands apart from training, in that it prompts individuals to 
attain a foundation from which to articulate solutions to ambiguous problems, a signature 
of the three block war.  Training offers a common baseline from which to execute 
specific tasks and functions in pursuit of a predetermined solution.126  Education is also 
predicated on experience, gained within a forum that forces individuals to analyze and 
challenge what they believe to be true in light of seemingly contradictory facts, another 
hallmark of full spectrum operations.   
The resultant question is: What is the right education to foster attitudinal 
responses to full spectrum operations?  The answer is creating a formal forum where 
leaders are constantly forced to analyze emerging ideas, coupled with a program that 
allows them to compare and contrast different methodologies.  A model for achieving this 
can be found in the training requirement for Army Foreign Area Officers (FAOs,) where 
after receiving region specific language training and graduate school education, they are 
“immersed” into designated regions for periods up to a year.  During this immersion, and 
armed with command of the language, FAOs are expected to observe and analyze the 
cultural, economic, political and especially military trends that can later provide a 
contextual basis for strategic assignments as military attaches and regional experts.  This 
educational experience is not unlike what the Marine Corps dictated to its officers and 
non commissioned officers at the tactical level.  Their program requires Marines to 
develop language proficiency and cultural specialization (sans full immersion) of nations 
along the “arc of instability” in the event they may have to conduct a future three block 
war there.127  
Achieving this level of educational integration can be accomplished by 
integrating it with the changes to the personnel system, by what can be considered an 
investment in the Army’s human capital.  Investment in human capital should be at the 
core of modifying the personnel and education systems, because it is leaders who in the 
long run will be responsible for attitudinal acceptance of full spectrum operations.  
Breaking the Army’s internal biases towards building a stability ethic, fostering a 
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personnel system that selects the correct generals and retains innovative junior  
officer, and educating the officer corps to allow them to successfully prosecute a three 
block war are challenges that must be met in order for the Army to evolve as a 
professional organization. 
D. CONCLUSIONS  
This thesis sought to answer the research question:  How can the Army internalize 
full spectrum operations, to the inclusion of stability operations, into its culture and 
operations?  In answering this question, this thesis examined three supporting quandaries:   
1. How important is a consistent correlation between the national security 
strategy and full spectrum operations doctrine to the Army’s 
internalization of stability operations as a permanent mission-set?  
2. How can the Army operationalize full spectrum operations, specifically 
the inclusion of stability operations, to allow the doctrine to be 
internalized?   
3. How will the Army overcome conceptual and institutional barriers 
organizationally internalize full spectrum operations doctrine?   
The answer to the original research question lies in the exploration and analysis of 
each of these supporting questions.   
It is the findings of this thesis that full spectrum operations will be internalized in 
the U.S. Army under the following three conditions:   
1. The National Security Strategy formally and consistently embraces the use 
of military to conduct stability operations in support of national objectives.  
As discussed in Chapter II, this is the best method for prompting the Army 
to accept full spectrum operations, and specifically stability operations, as 
a permanent mission-set with the accompanying imperative to internalize 
it.   
2. The Army is able to doctrinally evolve the full spectrum concept, and 
devise a training model that supports the operationalizing of full spectrum 
operations.  As described in Chapter III, addressing these imperatives 
requires the Army to rectify core foundational issues such as leader 
professional development and the optimized force structure for full 
spectrum operations.   
3. The Army is able to hedge the gaps in the whole of government approach, 
and overcome internal biases as represented by the personnel system.  
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The future of the Army is directly tied to its ability to internalize the precepts of 
full spectrum operations.  This assertion is derived from the notion that the United States, 
as a nation values the capabilities that a full spectrum military brings to the international 
arena.  In the upcoming times of fiscal austerity the perceived value of a full spectrum 
capable force will be tested, both politically and within the ranks, with each interested 
party attempting to safeguard their bureaucratic fiefdoms.  The Army has no stability 
branch, begging the question: who will see the value in internalizing full spectrum 
operations into the Army’s organization and culture.       
Incoming Chief of Staff, General Dempsey has signaled that he values the 
precepts of full spectrum operations, yet it remains to be seen if he can midwife the 
concept through the conditions laid out in this thesis.  General Dempsey framed the 
overarching challenge of internalizing full spectrum operations, reforming the personnel 
system, when he spoke of placing “value” on that which makes the Army a profession, 
and on “further reflecting that value in promotions, advancements, and selection for 
command.” 128  I argue that as a professional organization, the Army has an obligation to 
the nation to change in the face of new realities as represented by the challenge of 
internalizing full spectrum operations, and to “value” the internalization of stability 
operations doctrine.  
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